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Jamming Games in the MIMO Wiretap
Channel With an Active Eavesdropper
Amitav Mukherjee and A. Lee Swindlehurst
Abstract
This paper investigates reliable and covert transmission strategies in a multiple-input multiple-output
(MIMO) wiretap channel with a transmitter, receiver and an adversarial wiretapper, each equipped with
multiple antennas. In a departure from existing work, the wiretapper possesses a novel capability to act
either as a passive eavesdropper or as an active jammer, under a half-duplex constraint. The transmitter
therefore faces a choice between allocating all of its power for data, or broadcasting artificial interference
along with the information signal in an attempt to jam the eavesdropper (assuming its instantaneous
channel state is unknown). To examine the resulting trade-offs for the legitimate transmitter and the
adversary, we model their interactions as a two-person zero-sum game with the ergodic MIMO secrecy
rate as the payoff function. We first examine conditions for the existence of pure-strategy Nash equilibria
(NE) and the structure of mixed-strategy NE for the strategic form of the game. We then derive equilibrium
strategies for the extensive form of the game where players move sequentially under scenarios of perfect
and imperfect information. Finally, numerical simulations are presented to examine the equilibrium
outcomes of the various scenarios considered.
Index Terms
Physical layer security, MIMO wiretap channel, game theory, jamming, secrecy rate, Nash Equilibria.
I. INTRODUCTION
The two fundamental characteristics of the wireless medium, namely broadcast and superposition,
present different challenges in ensuring secure and reliable communications in the presence of adversaries.
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2The broadcast nature of wireless communications makes it difficult to shield transmitted signals from
unintended recipients, while superposition can lead to the overlapping of multiple signals at the receiver.
As a result, adversarial users are commonly modeled either as (1) a passive eavesdropper that tries to
listen in on an ongoing transmission without being detected, or (2) a malicious transmitter (jammer) that
tries to degrade the signal quality at the intended receiver. Two distinct lines of research have developed
to analyze networks compromised by either type of adversary, as summarized below.
A network consisting of a transmitter-receiver pair and a passive eavesdropper is commonly referred
to as the wiretap channel. The information-theoretic aspects of this scenario have been explored in some
detail [1]–[3]. In particular, this work led to the development of the notion of secrecy capacity, which
quantifies the maximal rate at which a transmitter can reliably send a secret message to the receiver,
without the eavesdropper being able to decode it. Ultimately, it was shown that a non-zero secrecy
capacity can only be obtained if the eavesdropper’s channel is of lower quality than that of the intended
recipient. The secrecy capacity metric for the multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) wiretap channel,
where all nodes may possess multiple antennas, has been studied in [4]-[9], for example. There are two
primary categories of secure transmission strategies for the MIMO wiretap channel, depending on whether
the instantaneous channel realization of the eavesdropper is known or unknown at the transmitter. In this
work we assume that this information is not available, and thus the transmitter incorporates an “artificial
interference” signal [7]-[10] along with the secret message in an attempt to degrade the eavesdropper’s
channel, as elaborated on in Section II.
The impact of malicious jammers on the quality of a communication link is another problem of long-
standing interest, especially in mission-critical and military networks. A common approach is to model
the transmitter and the jammer as players in a game-theoretic formulation with the mutual information
as the payoff function, and to identify the optimal transmit strategies for both parties [11]-[13]. Recent
work has extended this technique to compute the optimal spatial power allocation for MIMO and relay
channels with various levels of channel state information (CSI) available to the transmitters [14]-[17].
In this paper, we consider a MIMO communication link in the presence of a more sophisticated and
novel adversary, one with the dual capability of either passively eavesdropping or actively jamming any
ongoing transmission, with the objective of causing maximum disruption to the ability of the legitimate
transmitter to share a secret message with its receiver. The legitimate transmitter now faces the dilemma
of establishing a reliable communication link to the receiver that is robust to potential jamming, while
also ensuring confidentiality from interception. Since it is not clear a priori what strategies should be
adopted by the transmitter or adversary per channel use, a game-theoretic formulation of the problem
3is a natural solution due to the mutually opposite interests of the agents. Unlike the jamming scenarios
mentioned above that do not consider link security, the game payoff function in our application is chosen
to be the ergodic MIMO secrecy rate between the legitimate transmitter-receiver pair. Related concurrent
work on the active eavesdropper scenario [18], [19] has focused on single-antenna nodes without the use
of artificial interference, possibly operating together with additional ‘helping’ relays. The single-antenna
assumption leads to a much more restrictive set of user strategies than the MIMO scenario we consider.
The contributions of the paper are as follows: (1) we show how to formulate the MIMO wiretap channel
with a jamming-capable eavesdropper as a two-player zero-sum game, (2) we characterize the conditions
under which the strategic version of the game has a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, (3) we derive the
optimal mixed strategy profile for the players when the pure-strategy Nash equilibrium does not exist, and
(4) we study the extensive or Stackelberg version of the game where one of the players moves first and
the other responds, and we also characterize the various equilibrium outcomes for this case under perfect
and imperfect information. These contributions appear in the paper as follows. The assumed system
model and CSI assumptions are presented in the next section. The strategic formulation of the wiretap
game is described in Section III, where the two-player zero-sum payoff table is developed, the conditions
for existence of pure-strategy Nash equilibria are derived, and the optimal mixed strategy formulation
is discussed. The extensive version of the wiretap game with perfect and imperfect information where
the players move sequentially is detailed in Section IV. Outcomes for the various game formulations are
studied via simulation in Section V, and conclusions are presented in Section VI.
Notation: We will use CN (0, 1) to denote a circular complex Gaussian distribution with zero-mean
and unit variance. We also use E{·} to denote expectation, I(·; ·) for mutual information, (·)T for the
transpose, (·)H for the Hermitian transpose, (·)−1 for the matrix inverse, Tr(·) for the trace operator, |·|
to denote the matrix determinant, λi(A) is the ith ordered eigenvalue of A, and I represents an identity
matrix of appropriate dimension.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We study the MIMO wiretap problem in which three multiple-antenna nodes are present: an Na-antenna
transmitter (Alice), an Nb-antenna receiver (Bob), and a malicious user (Eve) with Ne antennas, as shown
in Fig. 1. We assume that Alice does not have knowledge of the instantaneous CSI of the eavesdropper,
only the statistical distribution of its channel, which is assumed to be zero-mean with a scaled-identity
covariance. The lack of instantaneous eavesdropper CSI at Alice precludes the joint diagonalization of
the main and eavesdropper channels [9]. Instead, as we will show, Alice has the option of utilizing all
4her power for transmitting data to Bob, regardless of channel conditions or potential eavesdroppers, or
optimally splitting her power and simultaneously transmitting the information vector and an “artificial
interference” signal that jams any unintended receivers other than Bob. The artificial interference scheme
does not require knowledge of Eve’s instantaneous CSI, which makes it suitable for deployment against
passive eavesdroppers [7], [9],[20]–[22]. Eve also has two options for disrupting the secret information
rate between Alice and Bob: she can either eavesdrop on Alice or jam Bob, under a half-duplex constraint.
A. Signal Model
When Eve is in passive eavesdropping mode, the signal received by Bob is
yb = Hbaxa + nb, (1)
where xa is the signal vector transmitted by Alice, Hba is the Nb × Na channel matrix between Alice
and Bob with i.i.d elements drawn from the complex Gaussian distribution CN (0, 1), and nb is additive
complex Gaussian noise. When Eve is not jamming, she receives
ye =
√
g1Heaxa + ne, (2)
where Hea is the Ne × Na channel matrix between Alice and Eve with i.i.d elements drawn from the
complex Gaussian distribution CN (0, 1), and ne is additive complex Gaussian noise. The background
noise at all receivers is assumed to be spatially white and zero-mean complex Gaussian: E{nknHk } = σ2kI,
where k = b, e indicates Bob or Eve, respectively. The receive and transmit channels of the eavesdropper
have gain factors √g1 and √g2, respectively. These scale factors may be interpreted as an indicator of
the relative distances between Eve and the other nodes.
On the other hand, when Eve decides to jam the legitimate channel, Bob receives
yb = Hbaxa +
√
g2Hbexe + nb, (3)
where xe is the Gaussian jamming signal from Eve and Hbe is the Nb×Ne channel matrix between Eve
and Bob with i.i.d elements distributed as CN (0, 1). Due to the half-duplex constraint, Eve receives no
signal when she is jamming (ye = 0).
Alice’s transmit power is assumed to be bounded by Pa:
E{xaxHa } = Qa Tr(Qa) ≤ Pa ,
and similarly Eve has a maximum power constraint of Pe when in jamming mode. To cause maximum
disruption to Alice and Bob’s link, it is clear that Eve will transmit with her full available power Pe
5when jamming. In the most general scenario where Alice jams Eve by transmitting artificial interference,
we have
xa = Tz+T
′z′, (4)
where T,T′ are the Na × d, Na × (Na − d) precoding matrices for the d × 1 information vector z
and uncorrelated (Na − d)× 1 jamming signal z′, respectively. To ensure that the artificial interference
does not interfere with the information signal, a common approach taken in the literature [7], [9],[20]–
[25] is to make these signals orthogonal when received by Bob. If Alice knows Hba, this goal can be
achieved by choosing T and T′ as disjoint sets of the right singular vectors of Hba. Note that if the
users have only a single antenna, the effect of the artificial interference cannot be eliminated at Bob, and
it will degrade the SNR of both Bob and Eve. This makes it unlikely that Alice will employ a non-zero
artificial interference signal when she has only a single transmit antenna, which significantly restricts
Alice’s transmission strategy. The matrix Qa may be expressed as
Qa = TQzT
H +T′Q′zT
′H , (5)
where Qz,Q′z are the covariance matrices associated with z and z′, respectively. If we let ρ denote the
fraction of the total power available at Alice that is devoted to the information signal, then Tr(TQzTH) =
ρPa and Tr(T′Q′zT′H) = (1−ρ)Pa. Due to the zero-forcing constraint, it is clear that any power available
to Alice that is not used for the desired signal xa will be used for jamming, so between the signal and
artificial interference, Alice will transmit with full power Pa. The covariance matrices of the received
interference-plus-noise at Bob and Eve are
Kb =

 g2HbeQbeH
H
be + σ
2
b I if Eve jams
σ2b I if Eve listens
(6)
Ke = g1HeaT
′Q′zT
′HHHea + σ
2
eI, (7)
where Qbe is the covariance of the jamming signal transmitted by Eve, Tr(Qbe) ≤ Pe.
Note that we have assumed that Alice’s jamming signal (if any) is orthogonal to the information
signal received by Bob, and hence, from the point of view of mutual information, can be ignored in the
expression for Kb. For our purposes, we assume that Alice splits her transmit power between a stochastic
encoding codebook and artificial interference for every channel use in all scenarios, while Bob employs
a deterministic decoding function [1], [3]. Firstly, this ensures that the general encoding and decoding
architecture of the Alice-Bob link remains fixed irrespective of Eve’s actions. Secondly, for a point-to-
point channel without an eavesdropper (i.e., when the eavesdropper is jamming and not listening), using
6a stochastic codebook does not offer any advantage over a conventional codebook, but it does not hurt
either, i.e., the receiver still reliably decodes the transmitted codeword [3].
B. CSI Model
Given the signal framework introduced above, we are ready to discuss the important issue of CSI.
We have already indicated that Alice knows Hba in order to appropriately precode the jamming and
information signals via T and T′, conceivably obtained by public feedback from Bob after a training
phase. At the receiver side, we will assume that Eve knows the channel from Alice Hea and the covariance
Ke of the interference and noise, and similarly we will assume that Bob knows Hba and Kb. All other
CSI at the various nodes is assumed to be non-informative; the only available information is that the
channels are composed of independent CN (0, 1) random variables. This implies that when Eve jams
Bob, her lack of information about Hbe and the half-duplex constraint prevents her from detecting the
transmitted signal z and applying correlated jamming [14]. Consequently, she will be led to uniformly
distribute her available power over all Ne transmit dimensions, so that Qbe = PeNe I. Similarly, when Alice
transmits a jamming signal, it will also be uniformly distributed across the Na− d available dimensions:
Q′z =
(1−ρ)Pa
Na−d
I. While in principle Alice could use her knowledge of Hba to perform power loading,
for simplicity and robustness we will assume that the power of the information signal is also uniformly
distributed, so that Qz = ρPad I.
Given the above assumptions, equations (5)-(7) will simplify to
Qa =
ρPa
d
TTH + ηaT
′T′H (8)
Kb =
g2Pe
Ne
HbeH
H
be + σ
2
b I (9)
Ke = g1ηaHeaT
′T′HHHea + σ
2
eI, (10)
where we have defined ηa = (1−ρ)PaNa−d .
C. Secrecy Rates and Transmit Strategies
The MIMO secrecy capacity between Alice and Bob is obtained by solving [4], [6], [9]
Cs = max
Qa0
I (Xa;Yb)− I (Xa;Ye) , (11)
where Xa,Yb,Ye are the random variable counterparts of the realizations xa,ya,ye. Given the CSI
constraints discussed above, such an optimization cannot be performed since Alice is unaware of the
instantaneous values of all channels and interference covariance matrices. Consequently, we choose to
7work with the lower bound on the MIMO ergodic secrecy capacity based on Gaussian inputs and uniform
power allocation at all transmitters [7]:
Cs ≥EH
{
log2
∣∣∣∣I+ ρPad HbaTTHHHbaK−1b
∣∣∣∣
− log2
∣∣∣∣I+ g1ρPad HeaTTHHHeaK−1e
∣∣∣∣
}
,
(12)
where we define H , {Hba,Hbe,Hea}. This serves as a reasonable metric to assess the relative security
of the link and to explain the behavior of the players. Recall that we assume Alice has instantaneous CSI
for the link to Bob and only statistical CSI for Eve, and the achievability of an ergodic secrecy rate for
such a scenario was shown in [26]. Using ergodic secrecy as the utility function for the game between
Alice and Eve implies that a large number of channel realizations will occur intermediate to any changes
in their strategy. That is, the physical layer parameters are changing faster than higher (e.g., application)
layer functions that determine the user’s strategy. Thus, the expectation is taken over all channel matrices
(including Hba), which in turn provides Alice and Eve with a common objective function, since neither
possesses the complete knowledge of H that is needed to compute the instantaneous MIMO secrecy rate.
Eve must decide whether to eavesdrop or jam with an arbitrary fraction of her transmit power. Alice’s
options include determining how many spatial dimensions are to be used for data and artificial interference
(if any), and the appropriate fraction ρ that determines the transmit power allocated to them. As described
in [7], [21]–[23], [25], there are several options available to Alice for choosing ρ and d depending upon
the accuracy of her CSI, ranging from an exhaustive search for optimal values to lower-complexity
approaches based on fixed-rate assumptions. Numerical results from this previous work have indicated
that the achievable secrecy rate is not very sensitive to these parameters, and good performance can
be obtained for a wide range of reasonable values. The general approach of this paper is applicable to
essentially any value for ρ and d, although the specific results we present in the simulation section use a
fixed value for d and find the optimal value for ρ based on d under the assumption that the eavesdropper
is in fact eavesdropping, and not jamming.
In Section III we show that it is sufficient to consider a set of two strategies for both players without any
loss in optimality. In particular, we show that Alice need only consider the options of either transmitting
the information signal with full power, or devoting an appropriate amount of power and signal dimensions
to a jamming signal. On the other hand, Eve’s only reasonable strategies are to either eavesdrop passively
or jam Bob with all her available transmit power.
We will denote Eve’s set of possible actions as {E, J} to indicate either “Eavesdropping” or “Jamming,”
while Alice’s will be expressed as {F,A} to indicate “Full-power” devoted to the information signal, or
8a non-zero fraction of the power allocated to “Artificial interference.” The secrecy rates that result from
the resulting four possible scenarios will be denoted by Rik, where i ∈ {F,A} and k ∈ {E, J}.
Assuming Gaussian inputs z and z′, the MIMO secrecy rate between Alice and Bob when Eve is in
eavesdropping mode is
RiE =EH
{
log2
∣∣∣∣I+ ρPadσ2b HbaTTHHHba
∣∣∣∣
− log2
∣∣∣∣I+ g1ρPad HeaTTHHHeaK−1e
∣∣∣∣
}
,
(13)
whereas the secrecy rate when Eve is jamming reduces to
RiJ = EH
{
log2
∣∣∣∣I+ ρPad HbaTTHHHbaK−1b
∣∣∣∣
}
, (14)
where i = F,A denotes the transmission strategies available to Alice. We refer to (14) as a secrecy rate
even though there is technically no eavesdropper, since Eve’s mutual information is identically zero and
Alice still uses a stochastic encoder (cf. Sec. II). Therefore, when evaluating the secrecy rate definition
(11) for the case where Eve chooses to jam, the second term is zero which yields RFJ and RAJ in (14)
as the effective secrecy rate. Recall that the definition of the secrecy rate is the maximum transmission
rate which can be reliably decoded by Bob while remaining perfectly secret from Eve, which is still
satisfied by the rates in (14). Note also that when Alice employs artificial interference, a choice for ρ
and d must be made that holds regardless of Eve’s strategy. Therefore, the values of ρ and d that are
numerically computed to maximize RAE in (13) [7] remain unchanged for RAJ in (14). When Alice
transmits with full power, then d = r, where r = min(Na, Nb), and the precoder T consists of the right
singular vectors of Hba corresponding to the r largest singular values.
While Alice uses the same type of encoder regardless of Eve’s strategy, achieving the rates in (13)-
(14) requires adjustments to the code rate that will depend on Eve’s actions. For example, if Alice is
transmitting with full power (strategy F ), the code rate needed to achieve either RFE or RFJ in (13)
or (14) will be different. Thus, we assume that Alice can be made aware of Eve’s strategy choice, for
example through feedback from Bob, in order to make such adjustments1. Such behavior is not limited
to just Alice and Bob; Eve also makes adjustments based on Alice’s choice of strategy. In particular,
when Eve is eavesdropping, her method of decoding Alice’s signal will depend on whether or not Alice
is transmitting artificial interference. We do not consider adjustments such as these as part of Alice or
1Based on such feedback, Alice could also in principle switch from a stochastic encoder to a more standard non-secure code
if she discovers that Eve is jamming and not eavesdropping. In either case, the rate expressions in (13)-(14) will be valid.
9Eve’s strategy per se, which in our game theory framework is restricted to the decision of whether or
not to use artificial interference. We assume that minor adaptations to the coding or decoding algorithm
for Alice and Eve occur relatively quickly, and that any resulting transients are negligible due to our use
of ergodic secrecy rate as the utility function. The more interesting question is whether or not Alice and
Eve decide to change strategies based on the actions of the other is addressed in Section IV.
In the game-theoretic analysis of the next two sections, we will utilize the following general properties
of the MIMO wiretap channel:
(P1) RFE ≤ RAE
(P2) RAJ ≤ RFJ
The validity of (P2) is obvious; if Alice employs artificial interference, it reduces the power allocated
to the information signal, which in turn can only decrease the mutual information at Bob. Since Eve is
jamming, her mutual information is zero regardless of Alice’s strategy, so RAJ can never be larger than
RFJ . The validity of (P1) can be established by recalling that Alice chooses a value for ρ that maximizes
RAE , assuming Eve is eavesdropping. Since ρ = 1 is an available option and corresponds to RFE , Alice
can do no worse than RFE in choosing the optimal ρ for strategy RAE .
III. STRATEGIC WIRETAP GAME
In this section we construct the zero-sum model of the proposed wiretap game. We define the payoff
to Alice as the achievable MIMO secrecy rate between her and Bob. Modeling the strategic interactions
between Alice and Eve as a strictly competitive game leads to a zero-sum formulation, where Alice tries
to maximize her payoff and Eve attempts to minimize it.
Formally, we can define a compact strategy space Ai, i = 1, 2, for both Alice and Eve: Alice has
to optimize the pair (d, ρ) ∈ A1, where ρ is chosen from the unit interval [0, 1] and d ∈ {1, . . . , r =
min(Na, Nb)}; and Eve can choose her jamming power Pj ∈ A2 from the interval [0, Pe], where zero
jamming power corresponds to the special case of passive eavesdropping. In other words, each player
theoretically has a continuum of (pure) strategies to choose from, where the payoff for each combination
of strategies is the corresponding MIMO secrecy rate. In the following discussion, let (d∗s, ρ∗s) represent
the choice of Alice’s parameters that maximizes the ergodic secrecy rate RAE .
The complete set of mixed strategies for player i is the set of Borel probability measures on Ai. Let ∆i
be the set of all probability measures that assign strictly positive mass to every nonempty open subset of
Ai. The optimal mixed strategy for player i must belong to ∆i, since any pure strategies that are assigned
zero probability in equilibrium can be pruned without changing the game outcome. Furthermore, as in
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the case of finite games, the subset of pure strategies included in the optimal mixed strategy must be best
responses to particular actions of the opponent [27]. Consider Alice: when Eve chooses the action of
eavesdropping, (d∗s, ρ∗s) is Alice’s corresponding best response pure strategy since by definition it offers
a payoff at least as great as any other possible choice of (d, ρ) [cf. (P1)]. Similarly, when Eve chooses to
jam with any arbitrary power, Alice’s best response pure strategy is (d = r, ρ = 1) [cf. (P2)]. Therefore,
these two pure strategies are Alice’s best responses for any possible action by Eve, and it is sufficient
to consider them alone in the computation of the optimal mixed strategy since all other pure strategies
are assigned zero probability. A similar argument holds for Eve with her corresponding best responses
of Pj = 0 and Pj = Pe.
Therefore, it is sufficient to consider the following strategy sets X ,Y for the players: Alice chooses
between transmitting with full power for data (F) or devoting an appropriate fraction of power to jam
Eve (A), described as X = {F,A}. Eve must decide between eavesdropping (E) or jamming Bob with
full power Pe (J) at every channel use, represented by Y = {E, J}.
A. Pure-strategy Equilibria
The strategic form of the game where Alice and Eve move simultaneously without observing each
other’s actions can be represented by the 2 × 2 payoff matrix R in Table I. Our first result establishes
the existence of Nash equilibria for the strategic game.
Proposition 1: For an arbitrary set of antenna array sizes, transmit powers and channel gain parameters,
the following unique pure-strategy saddle-points or Nash Equilibria (NE) (x∗, y∗) exist in the proposed
MIMO wiretap game:
R (x∗, y∗) =
{
RAE if RAE ≤ RAJ (15a)
RFJ if RFJ ≤ RFE . (15b)
Proof : Of the 24 possible orderings of the four rate outcomes, only six satisfy both conditions (P1)-(P2)
of the previous section. Furthermore, it is easy to check that only two of these six mutually exclusive
outcomes results in a pure NE. If RAE ≤ RAJ , then assumptions (P1) and (P2) imply the following rate
ordering
RFJ ≥ RAJ ≥ RAE︸︷︷︸
NE
≥ RFE . (16)
In this case, RAE represents an NE since neither Alice nor Eve can improve their respective payoffs by
switching strategies; i.e., the secrecy rate will decrease if Alice chooses to transmit the information signal
with full power, and the secrecy rate will increase if Eve decides to jam. Similarly, when RFJ ≤ RFE ,
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then (P1)-(P2) result in the rate ordering
RAE ≥ RFE ≥ RFJ︸︷︷︸
NE
≥ RAJ , (17)
and RFJ will be the mutual best response for both players. Evidently only one such ordering can be true
for a given wiretap game scenario.
B. Mixed-strategy Equilibria
Proposition 1 establishes that there is no single pure strategy choice that is always optimal for either
player if the inequalities in (16)-(17) are not satisfied. This occurs in four of the six valid rate orderings
of the entries of R that satisfy conditions (P1)-(P2). Therefore, since the minimax theorem guarantees
that any finite zero-sum game has a saddle-point in randomized strategies [29], in such scenarios Alice
and Eve should randomize over X × Y; that is, they should adopt mixed strategies.
Let p = (p, 1− p) and q = (q, 1 − q), 0 ≤ p, q ≤ 1, represent the probabilities with which Alice and
Eve randomize over their strategy sets X = {F,A} and Y = {E, J}, respectively. In other words, Alice
plays x = F with probability p, while Eve plays y = E with probability q. Alice obtains her optimal
strategy by solving
max
p
min
q
pTRq, (18)
while Eve optimizes the corresponding minimax problem. For the payoff matrix R in Table I, the optimal
mixed strategies and unique NE value v of the game can be easily derived as [28], [29]
(p∗, 1− p∗) = (RAJ −RAE, RFE −RFJ)/D (19a)
(q∗, 1− q∗) = (RAJ −RFJ , RFE −RAE)/D (19b)
v(p∗, q∗) = (RFERAJ −RFJRAE)/D, (19c)
where D = RFE+RAJ−RFJ−RAE . The mixed NE above is unique according to the classic properties
of finite matrix games [28], since the optimization in (18) has a unique solution. A graphical illustration of
the saddle-point in mixed strategies as p and q are varied for a specific wiretap channel is shown in Fig. 2.
For the specified parameters Na = 5, Nb = 3, Ne = 4, d = 2, Pa = Pe = 20dB, g1 = 1.1, g2 = 0.9, the
rate ordering turns out to be RAE = 5.04 > RFJ = 5.02 > RAJ = 2.85 > RFE = 0, which results in
a mixed NE with optimal mixing probabilities (p∗ = 0.307, q∗ = 0.294) and value v = 3.45. Alice’s
bias towards playing x = A more frequently is expected since that guarantees a secrecy rate of at least
2.85, whereas playing x = F risks a worst-case payoff of zero. Eve is privy to Alice’s reasoning and is
therefore biased towards playing y = J more frequently since she prefers a game value close to RAJ .
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The repeated wiretap game is a more sophisticated strategic game model in which Alice and Eve play
against each other repeatedly over multiple stages in time. At each stage, the set of player strategies and
payoff function representation is identical to the single-stage zero-sum game R in Table I. In our context,
the single-stage game can be considered to represent the transmission of a single codeword, with the
repeated game spanning the successive transmission of multiple codewords. Let the payoff to Alice at
stage k be denoted as R [k]. Under the standard repeated game model [29], the payoffs are accrued after
each stage, and both players have perfect information of the adversary’s moves. If the game is repeated
over an infinite time horizon, the cumulative payoff (of Alice) over the duration of the game is given by
Rp = (1− δ)
∞∑
k=0
δkR [k] (20)
where the discounting factor δ, 0 ≤ δ < 1, ensures that Rp is finite. Unlike general nonzero-sum repeated
games where players can improve payoffs via cooperation over time [30], the strictly competitive nature
of the zero-sum wiretap game results in Alice and Eve repeatedly playing their single-stage game NE
strategies. For example, it is clear that Eve minimizes Rp by minimizing R [k] at each stage k, which is
achieved by playing as dictated by Proposition 1 or (19) at each stage. If the game is played over a finite
number of stages instead, the players will continue to play their single-stage game NE strategies by the
same argument. The concepts developed in Sec. IV-B are applicable to the more involved repeated game
scenario where Alice and Eve have imperfect observations of each other’s actions.
IV. EXTENSIVE FORM WIRETAP GAME
Given the strategic game analysis of the previous section, we can now proceed to analyze the actions
of a given player in response to the opponent’s strategy. Here, one player is assumed to move first,
followed by the opponent’s response, which can then lead to a strategy (and code rate) change for the
first player, and so on. Accordingly, in this section we examine the sequential or extensive form of the
MIMO wiretap game, which is also known as a Stackelberg game. The standard analysis of a Stackelberg
game is to cast it as a dynamic or extensive-form game and elicit equilibria based on backward induction
[28]. We begin with the worst-case scenario where Alice moves first by either playing F or A, which
is observed by Eve who responds accordingly. It is convenient to represent the sequential nature of an
extensive-form game with a rooted tree or directed graph, as shown in Fig. 3. The payoffs for Alice
are shown at each terminal node, while the corresponding payoffs for Eve are omitted for clarity due
to the zero-sum assumption. In this section, we explore extensive-form games with and without perfect
information, and the variety of equilibrium solution concepts available for them.
13
A. Perfect Information
Assuming that Eve can distinguish which move was adopted by Alice, and furthermore determine the
exact jamming power (1 − ρ)Pa if she is being jammed by Alice, then the extensive game is classified
as one of perfect information. In the sequel, we will make use of the notions of an information state
and a subgame. A player’s information state represents the node(s) on the decision tree at which she
must make a move conditioned on her knowledge of the previous move of the opponent. For the case
of perfect information in Fig. 3, Alice has a single information state, while Eve has two information
states (each with a single node) based on Alice’s choice, since she has perfect knowledge of Alice’s
move. A subgame is a subset (subgraph) of a game that starts from an information state with a single
node, contains all of that node’s successors in the tree, and contains all or none of the nodes in each
information state [29].
Next, we analyze subgame-perfect equilibria (SPE) of the extensive game, which are a more refined
form of NE that eliminate irrational choices within subgames [28], [29]. It is well known that in extensive
games with perfect information, a sequential equilibrium in pure strategies is guaranteed to exist [29,
Theorem 4.7]. The equilibrium strategies can be obtained by a process of backward induction on the
extensive game tree, as shown below.
Proposition 2: In the extensive form wiretap game Γe,1 with perfect information where Alice moves
first, the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium rate with pure strategies is determined by the following:
SPE
(
Γe,1
)
=


RA,E if RAE ≤ RAJ
RF,J if RFJ ≤ RFE
max [RFE, RAJ ] RFE ≤ RFJ , RAJ ≤ RAE
Proof : The extensive game tree for this problem, depicted in Fig. 3, is comprised of three subgames:
the two subgames at Eve’s decision nodes, and the game itself with Alice’s decision node as the root.
Consider the scenario RFE ≤ RFJ and RAJ ≤ RAE . Under this assumption, Eve always plays E in the
lower-left subgame of Fig. 3, whereas Eve picks J in the lower-right subgame. By backward induction,
Alice then chooses the larger of [RFE, RAJ ] at her decision node. The other two SPE outcomes can be
established in a similar manner. 
Proposition 3: The extensive form game Γe,2 with perfect information where Eve moves first and Alice
moves second has the following subgame-perfect equilibrium rate outcome and corresponding strategies:
SPE
(
Γe,2
)
= min [RFJ , RAE ] . (22)
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Proof : The extensive game tree for this scenario is depicted in Fig. 4, and is comprised of three subgames:
the two subgames at Alice’s decision nodes, and the game itself with Eve’s decision node as the root.
Based on properties (P1)-(P2), Alice always plays A in the lower-left subgame and F in the lower-
right subgame. By backward induction, Eve then chooses the action corresponding to the smaller payoff
between [RAE, RFJ ] at her decision node. 
Note that in the scenario where Alice moves first, she chooses her coding parameters based on the
assumption that Eve acts rationally and adopts the equilibrium strategy in Proposition 2. We see from
both propositions that, when conditions for one of the pure-strategy NEs hold, the outcome of both Γe,1
and Γe,2 will be the corresponding NE. This is also true of an extensive game with more than 2 stages;
if an NE exists, the overall SPE outcome will be composed of repetitions of this constant result.
B. Imperfect Information
We now consider extensive wiretap games with imperfect information, where the player moving second
has an imperfect estimate of the prior move made by her opponent. Let Γe,3f and Γ
e,4
f denote the games
where Alice and Eve move first, respectively. The game tree representation of Γe,3f can be drawn by
connecting the decision nodes of Eve in Fig. 3 to indicate her inability to correctly determine Alice’s move
in the initial phase of the game. Thus, in this case, Eve effectively only possesses a single information
state. While no player has an incentive to randomize in the game with perfect information in Section IV-A,
mixed strategies enter the discussion when the game is changed to one of imperfect information. The
subgame perfect equilibrium solution is generally unsatisfactory for such games, since the only valid
subgame in this case is the entire game Γe,3f itself. Therefore, sequential equilibrium is a stronger solution
concept better suited for extensive games of imperfect information.
An extreme case of imperfect information in Γe,3f is the scenario where it is common knowledge at
all nodes that Eve is completely unable to determine what move was made by Alice in the first stage
of the game. Let Eve then assign the a priori probabilities (α, 1− α) to Alice’s moves over {F,A} for
some ρ and d, while Eve herself randomizes over {E, J} with probabilities (γ, 1− γ). Therefore, Eve’s
left and right decision nodes are reached with probability α and (1− α), respectively. There are three
possible supports for Eve’s moves at her information state: pure strategies {E} or {J} exclusively, or
randomizing over {E, J}. In the general scenario where Eve randomizes over {E, J} with probabilities
(γ, 1 − γ), her expected payoff can be expressed as
−α [γRFE + (1− γ)RFJ ] + (α− 1) [γRAE + (1− γ)RAJ ] .
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Using a probabilistic version of backward induction, it is straightforward to compute the sequential
equilibrium of Γe,3f , which in fact turns out to be identical to the mixed-strategy NE in (19). A similar
argument holds for Γe,4f with no information at Alice, which arises if no feedback is available from Bob.
It is much more reasonable to assume that the player moving second is able to form some estimate
of her opponent’s move, known as the belief vector [29]. An example of how such a scenario may
play out is described here. Consider the game Γe,4f , where Alice’s belief vector represents the posterior
probabilities of Eve having played {E} and {J} in the first stage. Assume that Bob collects M signal
samples and provides Alice with an inference of Eve’s move via an error-free public feedback channel.
The competing hypotheses at Bob are
H0 : yb [n] = Hbaxa [n] + nb [n]
H1 : yb [n] = Hbaxa [n] +√g2Hbexe [n] + nb [n] ,
(23)
for n = 0, . . . ,M − 1, where the null hypothesis H0 corresponds to Eve listening passively and the
alternative hypothesis H1 is that she is jamming Bob. Here, the channels are assumed to be constant over
the sensing interval [31] and known to Bob since he possesses local CSI. Aggregating the samples into
a (Nb×M) matrix Yb =
[
yb [0] . . . yb [M − 1]
]
, we observe that Yb ∼ CN (0,Z0) under H0 and
Yb ∼ CN (0,Z0 + Z1) under H1, where
Z0 ,HbaQaH
H
ba + σ
2
b I
Z1 ,
(
Pe
Ne
)
HbeH
H
be.
Assuming that Bob employs a minimum probability of error (MPE) detector [32], the hypothesis test
is
f (Yb|H1)
f (Yb|H0)
H1
≷
H0
Pr (H1)
Pr (H0) = η (24)
where Pr (H1) and Pr (H0) are prior probabilities assigned to the hypotheses by Bob. A worst-case
assumption for the prior probabilities is given by Eve’s minimax mixing probabilities in (19b). Taking
the logarithm on both sides of (30) and inserting the appropriate densities
f (Yb|H1) =pi−MNb |Z0 + Z1|M
× exp
(
−Tr
(
(Z0 + Z1)
−1
YbY
H
b
))
(25)
f (Yb|H0) = pi−MNb |Z0|M exp
(−Tr (Z−10 YbYHb )) , (26)
after some manipulations we obtain the test
Tr
((
Z−10 − (Z0 + Z1)−1
)
YbY
H
b
)H1
≷
H0
η′ (27)
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where η′ = ln (η) + |Z0 + Z1|M + |Z0|M .
Finally, Alice determines her best response based on the posterior probabilities (beliefs) of the hypothe-
ses, which is the definition of a sequentially rational strategy [29]. The requisite posterior probabilities
are αi , Pr {Hi|Yb} = f (Yb|Hi) Pr {Hi}/f (Yb), i = 0, 1, with α1 = 1 − α0 and f (Yb) =∑
i (f (Yb|Hi) Pr {Hi}). At equilibrium, Alice has by definition no incentive to switch actions, which
implies that her expected payoffs are the same. Since her expected payoff if she plays {F} is α0RFE +
(1− α0)RFJ , and α0RAE+(1− α0)RAJ if she plays {A}, it follows that Alice’s best response is given
by
BRA (α0) =

 F if α0 ≤
(RFJ−RAJ)
(RAE−RFE+RFJ−RAJ)
A otherwise.
(28)
On the other hand, since Eve moves first in Γe,4f , she does not have causal knowledge of Alice’s beliefs,
and therefore continues to play her minimax strategies in (19b).
For the game Γe,3f where Eve moves second, she forms her beliefs about Alice’s move ({F} or {A})
from the binary hypothesis test
H0 : ye = √g1Heaz [n] + ne [n]
H1 : ye = √g1HeaTz [n] +√g1HeaT′z′ [n] + ne [n]
(29)
for n = 0, . . . ,M − 1. The (Ne × M) sample matrix Ye =
[
ye [0] . . . ye [M − 1]
]
follows the
distributions Ye ∼ CN (0,Z0) under H0 and Ye ∼ CN (0,Z1) under H1, where
Z0 ,
(
g1Pa
Na
)
HeaH
H
ea + σ
2
eI
Z1 ,
(
g1ρPa
Na
)
HeaTT
HHHea
+
(
g1 (1− ρ)Pa
Na
)
HeaT
′T′
H
HHea + σ
2
eI.
The MPE test at Eve thus simplifies to
Tr
((
Z−10 − (Z1)−1
)
YbY
H
b
)H1
≷
H0
η′ (30)
where η′ = ln (η)+ |Z1|M + |Z0|M , and η is the ratio of worst-case prior probabilities based on (19a). By
the equivalence of equilibrium payoffs, Eve’s best response based on her computed posterior probabilities
(α0, 1− α0) is
BRE (α0) =

 E if α0 ≤
(RAE−RAJ )
(RAE−RFE+RFJ−RAJ)
J otherwise.
(31)
Since Alice has no means of estimating the beliefs possessed by Eve, Alice plays her maximin strategy
as specified by (19a) when she moves first.
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V. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we present several examples that show the equilibrium secrecy rate payoffs for various
channel and user configurations. All displayed results are based on the actual numerically computed
secrecy rates with 5000 independent trials per point. NE rates are depicted using a dashed red line where
applicable. In all of the simulations, the noise power was assumed to be the same for both Bob and Eve:
σ2b = σ
2
e = 1.
For the strategic game in Fig. 5 we set Na = Ne = 8, Nb = 6, and Eve’s power is larger than Alice’s:
Pe = 4Pa. The optimal choice for the signal dimension in this scenario is d = 4. Prior to the cross-over,
a pure strategy NE in RAE is the game outcome since the rate ordering is that of (16), whereas after
the cross-over it is optimal for both players to play mixed strategies according to (19). In this case,
randomizing strategies clearly leads to better payoffs for the players as Eve’s jamming power increases,
compared to adopting a pure strategy. The optimal mixing probabilities are shown in Fig. 5(b) with a
clear division between pure and mixed strategy NE regions. The pure NE is lost as Pa increases since
RAE grows more quickly than RAJ . This is because increasing Pa under AE both improves Bob’s rate
and reduces Eve’s rate, since more power is available for both signal and jamming. For AJ, increasing Pa
can only improve Bob’s rate since Eve is not impacted by the artificial interference (any power devoted
to artificial interference is wasted).
For the case of equal transmit powers Pe = Pa = 100 and parameters Na = 6, Nb = 3, d = 2, the
outcomes of the strategic game as the ratio of eavesdropper to transmitter antennas varies is shown in
Fig. 6. We observe that a similar dichotomy exists between a pure-strategy saddle-point region and a
mixed-strategy equilibrium in terms of Ne/Na (with the transition roughly at (Ne/Na) = 1 marked by
the dashed red line).
Next, the SPE outcomes of the two extensive-form games Γe,1 and Γe,2 over a range of transmit power
ratios Pe/Pa are shown in Fig. 7. The red and blue dashed lines represent the subgame-perfect outcomes
of the game where Alice moves first or second, respectively, as defined in Proposition 2 and Corollary
1. In the extensive form game, Alice could adjust her transmission parameters (ρ, d,T, etc.) in addition
to her overall strategy (A or F ) in response to Eve’s move. For simplicity, and to allow us to present
the main result in a single figure, we have assumed instead that the transmission parameters are chosen
independently of Eve’s actions, as described for the strategic game. Observe that prior to the crossover
point of RAE and RAJ , both equilibria are equal as determined by Proposition 2, since a pure-strategy
NE results. We see that it is always beneficial for Alice to move second especially as Eve’s jamming
18
power increases, which agrees with intuition.
Finally, in Fig. 8 we compare the equilibrium outcomes of the extensive-form games with perfect and
imperfect information as a function of Pa, with Pe = 2Pa. The no-information lower bound is given
by the strategic game mixed-strategy NE. For the given choice of parameters, Alice is not significantly
disadvantaged when she moves first (Γe,1) in the idealized scenario of perfect information. In sharp
contrast, a carefully designed hypothesis test allows Alice to significantly improve her payoff in (Γe,4f )
given a noisy observation of Eve’s move, as compared to the no-information case. Since Pe = 2Pa in
this example, an increase in Alice’s transmit power also implies an increase in Eve’s power, which aids
the hypothesis test at Bob and thus Alice has a better estimate of Eve’s move. On the other hand, Eve’s
hypothesis test does not show the same improvement as Pa increases since the ratio between data and
artificial noise power remains virtually the same.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have formulated the interactions between a multi-antenna transmitter and a dual-mode eavesdrop-
per/jammer as a novel zero-sum game with the ergodic MIMO secrecy rate as the payoff function. We
derived conditions under which Nash equilibria exist and the optimal user policies in both pure and mixed
strategies for the strategic version of the game, and we also investigated subgame-perfect and sequential
equilibria in the extensive forms of the game with and without perfect information. Our numerical results
showed that a change in a single parameter set while others remain constant can shift the equilibrium
from a pure to a mixed NE outcome or vice versa.
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Fig. 1. MIMO wiretap channel with dual-mode active eavesdropper.
TABLE I
PAYOFF MATRIX R OF THE STRATEGIC FORM OF THE MIMO WIRETAP GAME.
Alice
Eve
Eavesdrop (E) Jam Bob (J)
Full Power (F) RFE RFJ
Artificial Noise (A) RAE RAJ
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Fig. 2. Game value in mixed strategies as the mixing probabilities at Alice and Eve are varied, Na = 5, Nb = 3, Ne = 4, d = 2,
Pa = Pe = 20dB, and g1 = 1.1, g2 = 0.9.
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Fig. 3. Extensive form game tree with perfect information Γe,1 where Alice moves first and Eve moves second.
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Fig. 4. Extensive form game tree with perfect information Γe,2 where Eve moves first and Alice moves second.
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